Dogmatic disagreements create arbitrage opportunities in competitive markets that are sufficiently complete. There may be someone in the economy who is certain (correctly or not on objective grounds) that gold prices will go up and someone else who believes there is a positive probability that gold prices will go down. The first person will have an arbitrage opportunity if at-the-money put options on gold have a positive price, while the second person will have an arbitrage opportunity if at-the-money put options on gold have a zero or negative price. Similarly, if some people are sure their favorite sport teams or horses will win but others are not so sure, any odds posted by a competitive bookmaker will imply arbitrage for one group or the other. 1 In practice, however, dogmatic differences in beliefs do not imply actual arbitrage that can be used to generate arbitrarily large profits because people have limited resources and cannot make "empty promises" of payments that exceed their own ability to pay in states the market cares about, even if those are states they personally believe to be impossible. The purpose of this article is to extend the study of the absence of arbitrage to situations in which no empty promises are permitted.
The fundamental theorem of asset pricing asserts the equivalence of the absence of arbitrage, the existence of a positive linear pricing rule, and the existence of an optimal demand for some agent who prefers more to less. 2 This result is important, for example, since it tells us that if asset price processes admit no arbitrage, then they are consistent with equilibrium (in a single-agent economy for the agent whose existence is ensured by the theorem). In other words, assuming equilibrium places no more and no less restriction on prices than assuming no arbitrage, absent additional assumptions.
The usual presentation of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing typically ignores payoffs in states to which the agent assigns zero probability. A linear pricing rule that attaches a positive price to a state that the agent believes is impossible would be inconsistent with expected utility maximization in competitive markets since selling short the corresponding Arrow-Debreu security provides consumption now with zero probability of future loss. On the other hand, a zero or negative state price would be inconsistent with utility maximization if the agent believes the state is possible since buying the Arrow-Debreu security for some state is an arbitrage, and a marginal purchase makes the agent better off.
Preventing an agent from making empty promises can rule out strategies that exploit positive prices in states to which the agent assigns zero probability. We model this as a nonnegative wealth constraint that is imposed in all states deemed to be "important" by a regulatory agency, consensus market beliefs, or some other mechanism. The shadow price of the binding constraint equals the price of the impossible state, restoring consistency between linear pricing and expected utility maximization. We state a new version of the fundamental theorem which equates absence of robust arbitrages (defined to be arbitrages not requiring empty promises), existence of a superlinear pricing rule (which may give positive price to states valued by the market even if the agent believes them impossible), and existence of an optimum for an agent who prefers more to less and cannot make empty promises.
A potential conceptual problem with the general analysis is one of enforcement: How do we ensure that an agent will choose a strategy that does not make empty promises in states of nature that the agent believes will never happen? Our main result on enforcement is that, whenever information arrives continuously, the no-empty-promises condition can be enforced by shutting down all investments for the rest of the time once the agent's wealth hits zero. Continuous information arrival implies that the portfolio value is continuous and therefore must hit zero before going negative. This property means that if the market halts the agent's trading the first time the wealth hits zero, then the wealth cannot become negative. Being able to enforce the no-empty-promises condition using only the paths of wealth is important because it eliminates the market's need to know the agent's strategy in all important states.
3 By contrast, monitoring the path of wealth would be insufficient to enforce no empty promises if information arrival were discontinuous (as it would be in a discrete-time model or a model with unpredictable jumps) because the market may be unable to anticipate whether wealth will become negative. We can compare this to the markingto-market process in futures markets. Daily marking to market presumably approximates continuous information arrival in that it permits exchanges to stop the activity of any trader who is in danger of having negative wealth, regardless of the trader's view of the future direction of the market. Markingto-market would be less effective if it were done monthly or if daily price variation were more volatile, both of which represent more discontinuous information arrival, requiring more margin money to complement marking to market.
In related work, Hindy (1995) studies the viability of a pricing rule when the agent must maintain a level of "risk-adjusted" equity. Hindy claims that viability is equivalent to the existence of a linear pricing rule which is the sum of two linear rules, one representing marginal utility of consumption and the other representing the shadow price of his solvency constraint. Our pricing rule has a similar decomposition, and dogmatic differences in beliefs provide a natural reason for the shadow price to be nontrivial, something absent in Hindy's analysis. In addition, our setting allows interesting option pricing and investment models (such as the Black-Scholes model) because we allow unbounded consumption and investment strategies. We also allow markets to be incomplete.
Several studies consider consumption and investment problems when agents disagree about the possible returns of risky assets. Wu (1991) and Pikovsky and Karatzas (1996) study optimal consumption in a model in which an agent has logarithmic preferences and "anticipates" future asset prices. Bergman (1996) argues that arbitrarily conditioning return processes to lie in some range may produce arbitrage opportunities; our results suggest that these arbitrages can be ruled out by a no-empty-promises condition. Loewenstein and Willard (1997) use results presented here to study equilibrium trading strategies and prices when agents face unforeseen contingencies.
Section 1 contains examples that illustrate the use of the no-emptypromises constraint. Section 2 contains the fundamental theorem of asset pricing with no empty promises for a single-period model with a finite number of states. Section 3 extends this result to a continuous-time model in which returns are assumed to be general special semimartingales. In Section 4, we show that the no-empty-promises condition can be enforced by shutting down investments when wealth hits zero, provided returns are continuous. Section 5 concludes.
Examples
We illustrate the connection between empty promises and arbitrage in a number of discrete-and continuous-time examples. In each of our examples, the agent has initial endowment w > 1 and preferences c 0 +log c 1 , where c 0 and c 1 represent current and terminal consumption, respectively. Assuming separable linear-logarithmic utility is in no way essential for the results, but this choice does simplify computation. The agent takes prices as given and conditions on information available at the start of trade. General results are given in later sections. The first column represents price of gold in the three states, and the second represents the price of the riskless asset.
Single-period examples
Example 1. An agent who believes all states are possible. We use this example to contrast the no-empty-promises setting. Suppose that the agent believes states H and M each occur with probability 2/5 and state L occurs with probability 1/5. Here is the agent's traditional choice problem.
Problem A. Choose portfolio weights (α 1 , α 2 ) to maximize expected utility of consumption
From the first-order conditions, the solution to Problem A equals α 1 = 23/525 and α 2 = 6/175. Example 2. An agent who believes a state is impossible. Here the agent is certain gold will outperform the bond: suppose the agent believes states H and M each occur with probability 1/2. Problem B is the traditional consumption choice problem.
Problem B.
Choose portfolio weights (α 1 , α 2 ) to maximize expected utility of consumption
Problem B does not have a solution because there is an arbitrage. For example, lending 3/2 units of the bond and buying 1 unit of the gold costs nothing but returns 15 units for sure under the agent's beliefs. The agent can reach any level of expected utility by undertaking enough of these net trades. However, for each trade the agent promises to pay 14 units of wealth in the event that state L occurs. In using this trade to construct the arbitrage, the agent promises to pay successively larger amounts of wealth conditional on state L, thus making an "empty promise" because potential losses will eventually exceed any given initial endowment.
The following choice problem has a solution because a no-emptypromises constraint rules out strategies that make these empty promises.
Problem C.
subject to the no-empty-promises constraint given by 30α 1 + 10α 2 ≥ 0 and
The solution to Problem C is α 1 = 1/14 and α 2 = −1/140. The shadow price on the binding no-empty-promises constraint (α 1 + 10α 2 ≥ 0) equals 15/29, the market price of the Arrow-Debreu security for the low state. The shadow price takes up the slack between zero marginal utility and a positive state price. Notice that the no-empty-promises constraint in this example is weaker than a no-short-sales constraint since α 1 can be arbitrarily negative if α 2 is positive enough to cover the position.
Here is an example to show that the no-empty-promises constraint does not always eliminate arbitrage opportunities. There is a solution to the choice problem when the agent believes state L is impossible, but there is no solution whenever the agent believes the gold price will fall with positive probability. This is true even under the no-empty-promises constraint because an at-the-money put option on gold has zero cost, has nonnegative payoffs, and pays a positive amount with positive probability.
In these examples we see that (i) there may be no arbitrage opportunities if the agent assigns positive probabilities to all states in which portfolios of the assets can have positive payoffs, even in the absence of a no-empty-promises constraint; (ii) if the agent assigns some of these states zero probability, then the resulting arbitrages may be ruled out by preventing the agent from making empty promises; and (iii) there may be "robust" arbitrages that will be available whether or not empty promises are permitted.
Continuous-time examples
We now demonstrate that similar conclusions hold in examples in which the agent trades continuously over a time interval [0, T ] . In this section the exposition is informal with a few details in footnotes; formal definitions and proofs are given in a later section.
Uncertainty is generated by the Wiener process Z , and the risky asset has instantaneous return µdt + σ d Z t , where µ and σ are positive constants. There is a riskless asset that has constant continuously compounded return represented by the positive constant r . We assume that the local risk premium µ − r is positive, so there is a unique state price density process ρ given by
where η = (µ − r )/σ . The current price of any random terminal payoff c 1 is given by E[ρ T c 1 ].
Example 4. No advance information. This is a special case of Merton (1971) . We use the fact that markets are complete to state the traditional consumption choice problem. T . The trading strategy that finances this consumption is
which invests a constant proportion of wealth in the risky asset.
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Our second example considers a case of advance information.
Example 5. Advance information I. Suppose the agent conditions prior to the start of trade on the belief that the terminal risky return will exceed the riskless return; that is, µT + σ Z T > r T or equivalently Z T > −ηT . Problem E states the traditional choice problem.
This problem has no solution because the agent can write put options paying only in states for which Z T is less than or equal to −ηT . This adds current consumption without violating the budget constraint and without decreasing expected utility. (The puts are never exercised under the agent's beliefs.) A problem is that states of nature to which the agent assigns zero probability have positive market prices. As in the finite-state example, a no-empty-promises constraint can restore the existence of a solution. Problem F has a solution given by c 0 = w − 1 and
where N (·) is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal random variable. The trading strategy that finances this consumption is
Our class of admissible trading strategies includes those for which each strategy θ is predictable and expected square integrable:
This guarantees that discounted wealth is a martingale under the risk-neutral probability measure.
which is the strategy of the original Merton problem (Example 4) plus a term φ which represents selling consumption when the risky asset over the whole period falls below the riskless return. (This additional amount is approximately zero when the risky asset's prior returns are much larger than the riskless return.) This term is defined by
and φ(T, y) = 0, where n is the density function for a standard random normal random variable. 6 As in the finite-state model, the shadow price of the no-empty-promises constraint takes up the slack between the positive state price density and the zero marginal utility of consumption in impossible states.
Example 6. Advance information II. In our final example, we suppose that the agent knows exactly the terminal price of the risky asset, say S T = 120. Here is the traditional choice problem.
Problem H includes the no-empty-promises constraint. No solution exists to either problem. We demonstrate this by constructing a "robust free lunch," which is an arbitrage payoff in the limit that does not 6 Here is a proof that this strategy is optimal for Problem F. Define the function
The process M t ≡ h(t, Z t ) is a martingale under the agent's prior beliefs, and Ito's lemma implies that
t M t , and note that W 0 = 1 and W T = c 1 , where c 1 is given in the solution to Problem F. To show that W is the wealth process that finances the optimal consumption, we need to solve for the optimal trading strategy. Ito's lemma implies
Comparing this to the budget equation [Equation (2)] in the continuous-time section yields the claimed optimal portfolio strategy. This strategy satisfies the expected square integrability condition because of the L 2 -isometry of stochastic integrals.
require empty promises. This robust free lunch will exploit the agent's belief that S T = 120 for sure and the zero market price of this event. We construct the robust free lunch using a sequence of butterfly spreads: 7 Let 0 < ε < 120 be given, and consider the payoff at maturity equal to max{0, ε−|S T −120|}, which can be constructed using a long position in two T -maturity European calls with an exercise price of 120 and a short position in two T -maturity European calls, one having an exercise price 120 − ε and the other 120 + ε. The value of the long position equals
where B S(K ) gives the Black-Scholes price of a European call with exercise price K and maturity T . As ε decreases to 0, the bracketed term converges to the (finite) second derivative of the Black-Scholes price with respect to the exercise price evaluated at K = 120. The price of the spread is O(ε 2 ), and an agent with a fixed endowment can purchase O(1/ε 2 ) spreads.
8 Each spread pays ε conditional on S T = 120, so the portfolio's payoff is O(1/ε). As ε decreases to 0, the terminal payoff increases without bound conditional on S T being equal to 120, so there is no optimum, even under the no-empty-promises constraint.
We draw the similar conclusions from the continuous-time examples as from the finite-state examples: (i) There are no arbitrage opportunities if the agents beliefs are positive on any event for which the state prices are positive. (ii) A no-empty-promises constraint can rule out arbitrage if the agent attaches zero probability to some states which have positive implicit prices. (iii) A "robust arbitrage" exists if the agent believes that a state is possible and it has a zero price.
The Single-Period Analysis
Having considered several examples which illustrate our no-empty-promises setting, we now turn to our general results. The starting point of our analysis is the standard neoclassical choice problem with finitely many states, no taxes or transaction costs, and possibly incomplete markets. Consistent with the partial equilibrium spirit of arbitrage arguments, we will consider the choice problem faced by an individual agent and will condition our analysis on the agent's (possibly endogenous) information at the start of the period. An agent's endowment includes a nonrandom nonnegative initial 7 Recall that a butterfly spread is a portfolio consisting of a short position in two call options at a given exercise price X and a long position in two call options, one of which has an exercise price higher than X and one of which has an exercise price lower than X . (This is a bet that the stock price at maturity will be near X .) While we have assumed that u is additively separable over time, our results would be the same, with the same proofs, for various classes of preferences, with or without additive separability, continuity, differentiability, concavity, or state independence; what really matters is that we have a sufficiently rich class in which more is preferred to less and the agent cares only about states that happen with positive probability. The results do not get "stronger" or "weaker" as we vary our assumptions on the class of utility functions: some get stronger while others get weaker as we restrict the class. The agent's choice variable is the portfolio weight vector α measured in units of shares purchased. Given these assumptions, the traditional choice problem is Problem 1.
Problem 1. Choose a vector α of portfolio weights to maximize expected utility of consumption
We will be concerned with a choice problem with the additional no-emptypromises constraint that it is not feasible to make promises that cannot be met in some set * ⊆ {1, 2, . . . , } of states. This is motivated by a requirement that trading partners will not permit the agent to risk insolvency. In some contexts, we could interpret * to be the set of possible states given consensus beliefs, or a superset of those possible states: leaving this issue vague permits application of the analysis to circumstances in which it is not obvious what is meant by consensus beliefs. With the no-empty-promises condition, we have Problem 2. 
Problem 2. Choose a vector α of portfolio weights to maximize expected utility of consumption
The traditional definition of arbitrage, given by Definition 1, depends only on payoffs and the individual's beliefs. Definition 1. An arbitrage is a net trade η in securities that pays off sometime with positive probability (either (X η) θ > 0 for some θ with π θ > 0 or −Pη > 0) and never has a positive probability of a loss (both −Pη ≥ 0 and (X η) θ ≥ 0 whenever π θ > 0).
For our current purposes, we want a new definition of arbitrage that is subject to a no-empty-promises condition. We cannot tell from looking at a net trade whether adding it to some proposed investment portfolio would violate the no-empty-promises condition, but we can tell whether it would if undertaken at large enough scale. The spirit of arbitrage is that it is inconsistent with optimization since it is a net trade that would continue to be feasible and improve utility at all scales and given any starting value. To remain within this spirit, we have "robust arbitrages," given by Definition 2.
Definition 2.
A robust arbitrage is an arbitrage η satisfying the no-empty-
Any robust arbitrage is obviously an arbitrage, but an arbitrage need not be a robust arbitrage if there are states the market cares about but are assigned zero probability by the agent. The arbitrage is "robust" because it is feasible even if the agent cannot make empty promises.
A positive linear pricing rule assigns positive price to all states with positive probability and zero price to all other states.
Definition 3.
A positive linear pricing rule is a vector p of state prices that correctly prices all assets (P = pX), assigns positive price to those states with positive probability ((π θ > 0) ⇒ ( p θ > 0)), and assigns zero price to all other states ((π θ = 0) ⇒ ( p θ = 0)).
We need to consider a superpositive linear pricing rule that assigns positive price to all states with positive probability but may assign positive price to other states if the market cares about them.
Definition 4.
A superpositive linear pricing rule is a vector p of state prices that correctly prices all assets (P = pX), assigns positive price to those states with positive probability ((π θ > 0) ⇒ ( p θ > 0)), assigns nonnegative price to all states in which empty promises are not permitted
, and assigns zero price to all other states (((π θ = 0) and (θ ∈ * )) ⇒ ( p θ = 0)).
To understand the connection between pricing and absence of robust arbitrages, it is useful to examine the choice problem. Under appropriate regularity assumptions, first-order necessary and sufficient conditions to Problem 2 are
for some Lagrange multipliers γ θ , θ ∈ * . If there is a solution to Problem 2, then the vector
forms a superpositive linear pricing rule. In an important state with positive shadow price but zero probability for the agent, the shadow price γ θ > 0 on the binding nonnegative wealth constraint takes up the slack between the zero marginal utility of consumption and the positive state price. By now we have accumulated the definitions needed to state the fundamental theorem of asset pricing in the single-period world with finitely many states, both in its original version and in its new version without empty promises. Proof. See Dybvig and Ross (1987) .
Here is the new version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing. While the proof follows the same broad outline as the proof of Dybvig and Ross (1987) , some details are more subtle. Proof. (iii) ⇒ (i): We want to show that existence of an optimum implies absence of robust arbitrage. Suppose to the contrary that there is an optimum but that there is also available a robust arbitrage. Since u(·, ·) is strictly increasing in both arguments, it follows that adding the robust arbitrage to the claimed optimum would not decrease value in any state, would increase value in the positive-probability state (or time 0) when consumption is in-creased, and would not violate the no-empty-promises constraint. Therefore it would dominate the claimed optimum, which is a contradiction.
(ii) ⇒ (iii): Given the existence of a superpositive linear pricing rule p, we need to show that some hypothetical agent has a maximum. We will show that a hypothetical agent with time-separable exponential von Neumann-Morgenstern utility function u(c 0 , c 1 ) = − exp(−c 0 ) + log(c 1 ) and a carefully chosen endowment has an optimum. The endowment we select has
and ω 0 = 0. Then it is easy to verify that α = 0 is an optimal portfolio choice given this endowment using the first-order condition [Equation (1) We are given that A ∩ M = ∅, and we want to show that there exists a state price vector p ∈ + such that (1) P = pX, (2) p θ > 0 whenever π θ > 0, and (3) p θ = 0 whenever π θ = 0 and θ ∈ * . Since A and M are nonempty disjoint convex sets, there exists a dual (price) vector φ ∈ 1+ , φ = 0, such that φa ≥ φm for all a ∈ A and m ∈ M. We will show shortly that such a φ can be chosen to satisfy φ 0 > 0 and φ θ > 0 whenever π θ > 0. In that case, p ≡ φ 0 −1 (φ 11 , . . . , φ 1 ) will be the required state price vector. Property (1), P = pX, follows from the fact that φ separates M, since M includes the result of investment of +1 or −1 unit of each asset individually. Property (2), p θ > 0 whenever π θ > 0, follows from the selection of φ with like properties. Property (3), p θ = 0 whenever π θ = 0 and θ ∈ * , follows from the fact that φ separates A, since π θ = 0 implies that A contains (1, 0, . . . , 0) plus K times the unit vector in the direction of the 1θ coordinate, for all positive and negative K .
It remains to show that the vector φ separating A and M can be chosen with φ 0 > 0 and φ 1θ > 0 whenever π θ > 0. It suffices to show that we can choose separate φ's to make each corresponding element (φ 0 or φ 1θ ) positive, since the sum of such φ's will still separate A and M but will make them all positive. Fix θ with π θ > 0, and suppose there are no robust arbitrages. (The argument for φ 0 is identical; only the notation is slightly different.) Arguing by contradiction, assume no φ separating A and M has φ 1θ > 0. Recall that the dual to a set X ∈ N is defined to be the convex set X + ∈ N defined by X + ≡ {y | (∀x ∈ X ) yx ≥ 0}. The set of φ's separating A and M is given by the nonzero elements of
Since (by our assumption in the argument by contradiction) no φ separating M and A has φ 1θ > 0, and since no φ separating A and M can have φ 1θ < 0 (or it would not separate A, since π θ > 0), it follows that
by property (i) of convex cones given before Karlin (1959) Theorem 5.3.1]. By the duality theorem for closed convex cones [Karlin (1959) , Theorem B.3.1, parts I and II], it follows, using the usual overline notation for set closure, that {φ | φ 1θ = 0}
where the first equality follows from the fact that A is a polyhedral cone and M is a subspace [Rockafellar (1970) , Theorem 20.3], and the second equality comes from the fact that M is closed. However, this contradicts absence of robust arbitrage, since the set {φ | φ 1θ = 0} + includes the vector with all zeros except for −1 in the component 1θ, and therefore M includes an element of A plus the vector of all zeros except for 1 in the component 1θ, which is itself an element of A. This completes the proof that (i) ⇒ (ii).
The Continuous-Time Analysis
We now turn to the continuous-time version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing without empty promises. The intuition of the finite-state results holds once we add structure to accommodate infinite-dimensional state spaces typically used in investments and option pricing.
Definitions
The agent trades finitely many risky securities in a frictionless, competitive, and possibly incomplete market over a trading interval [0, T ]. Security returns are defined on a probability space ( , F, P), where contains the set of states of nature and the σ -algebra F contains the events distinguishable at time T . The probability measure P is a reference measure and is used only to define returns in states to which the agent may or may not assign positive probability. We have no need to specify separately the price and dividend processes, so we simply assume that returns are generated by some special semimartingale process G, as in Back (1991) . 11 We also assume that there is an asset with a locally riskless instantaneous return represented by r t dt. Return processes and their coefficients are assumed to be adapted to a given right-continuous complete filtration F = {F t : t ∈ [0, T ]} that satisfies F T = F. Corresponding to a given trading strategy θ for the risky assets, there is a right-continuous wealth process that satisfies
P almost everywhere. To ensure that the process in Equation (2) is well defined, we assume that each trading strategy is F predictable and satisfies integrability conditions used to define stochastic integrals. Let denote the linear space of these strategies for which Equation (2) has a unique solution.
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The agent's beliefs are represented by a probability measure P I . We assume that P I is absolutely continuous relative to the reference measure P so that, after the fact, the agent and the market agree on trading profits.
13
Preferences for consumption plans (c 0 , c 1 ) are represented by the expected utility function
where u 0 (·) and u 1 (ω, ·) are continuous, increasing, and defined on + . The examples in Section 1 are special cases of this setting when P is interpreted as a weighted average of the agent's prior and conditional beliefs. We now define the commodity space for the agent. In infinite-state models such as ours, the topology of the commodity space is important because it influences the definitions of arbitrage and linear pricing. In our case, the topology must also allow convergence in important states of nature, even if the agent assigns them zero probability. A commodity space that is suitable for our purposes is C ≡ × L p ( , F, P), for some 1 ≤ p < ∞, where L p ( , F, P) is the space of P-equivalent random variables that have finite 11 A special semimartingale is a process that is uniquely representable as the sum of a predictable rightcontinuous finite-variation process and a right-continuous local martingale [Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, VII.23)] . A special semimartingale may be discontinuous. 12 Predictability requires strategies at time t to depend on information available only strictly before time t.
See Dellacherie and Meyer (1982, Chapter VIII) for conditions sufficient to define stochastic integrals and Protter (1990, Chapter 5. 3) for conditions sufficient to ensure unique solutions. 13 In discrete models, trading profits are defined sample path by sample path, and this would not be an issue, but stochastic integrals defining trading profits in continuous time are not. Agreeing on trading profits after the fact does seem to be a feature of the actual economy, and absolute continuity of P I in P implies that two agents agree on trading profits almost surely in both P and P I . This seems like a very minimal sort of rationality assumption for us to make. pth moments.
14 We will take convergence and continuity to be in the product norm topology on C.
The traditional choice problem of the agent is given in Problem 3. 
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In the no-empty-promises setting, the agent faces the additional constraint of being unable to make "empty promises" in some subset * of important states: the agent must maintain nonnegative wealth along P almost all paths t → W t (ω), ω ∈ * . We assume that * belongs to the σ -algebra F. As in the finite-state model, the no-empty-promises constraint may be motivated by a requirement that trading partners will not permit the agent to risk insolvency. Notice that if P( * ) = 0, then the no-empty-promises restriction is vacuous, and the problem would be essentially the same with or without empty promises.
We include the no-empty-promises constraint in Problem 4. 
almost surely). (c) Consumption and wealth satisfy the no-empty-promises condition
Unlike Problem 3, Problem 4 includes the no-empty-promises constraint (c), which requires consumption and the paths of wealth to be nonnegative in almost all states important to the market. We now define a traditional arbitrage. The intuition is similar to the finite-state setting except that a nonnegative wealth constraint is imposed only along paths the agent cares about.
14 An additional assumption that the Radon-Nikodym derivative
is essentially bounded would ensure that the commodity space is consistent for all agents and any consumption plan is p integrable against any agent's beliefs. This assumption is satisfied, for example, in our finite-state analysis and Examples 4 and 5 of Section 1; however, we do not use this assumption in our analysis. 15 The agent can choose arbitrarily negative consumption in states occurring with zero P I probability because these states do not enter into the expected utility calculation.
Definition 5. An arbitrage opportunity is a consumption plan (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ C financed by a trading strategy θ ∈ such that (a) Wealth satisfies Equation (2) A robust arbitrage additionally enforces the no-empty-promises condition along paths the market cares about. It is "robust" because it will be feasible even if no empty promises are permitted.
Definition 6.
A robust arbitrage is an arbitrage opportunity which satisfies the no-empty-promises constraint:
In general, we cannot tell whether adding a given net trade to some unknown portfolio violates the nonnegative wealth or the no-empty-promises constraint of an investor; however, we can tell if it will when undertaken at an arbitrarily large scale. The spirit of arbitrage is that it is inconsistent with optimization since it is a net trade which would continue to be feasible and improve utility at all scales and given any initial feasible plan. Both definitions of arbitrage here remain within this spirit.
In contrast to the finite-state case, the set of marketed net trades generally is not the intersection of an affine subspace with the positive orthant due to free disposal implicit in the financing condition c 1 ≤ W T , and more subtly, due to suicidal strategies even if c 1 = W T holds. 16 However, this set does form a convex cone, which we denote by M. Formally, M is the convex cone of marketed net trades ignoring nonnegative consumption constraints: the set of (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ C such that (a) there is a trading strategy θ ∈ with W satisfying Equation (2) (c) For any terminal consumption plan c 1 for which there is a feasible trading strategy θ ∈ such that wealth satisfies Equation (2) and the condition c 1 ≤ W T , we have ψ(c 1 ) ≤ W 0 .
(d) Terminal consumption plans positive only on events to which the agent assigns zero probability are costless (i.e., (∀E ∈ F)(P
Here is the definition of a "superpositive" linear pricing rule which may assign positive prices to important states, even to those impossible from the agent's perspective. 
, (∀E ∈ F)([P
We now formalize a notion of arbitrage in this continuous-time setting. We will use the concept of a "free lunch" to extend the notion of arbitrage to include continuity and free disposal.
18 A free lunch differs from an arbitrage in that a free lunch relies on the topology of the commodity space. The trouble with a free lunch is that each consumption plan in the sequence may be infeasible, yet the limit is called a free lunch. A free lunch will be attractive if there exists an agent in the economy who is willing to absorb a deviation that is "small" in the topology. 19 We now define the notation that we use to define a robust free lunch. Let 17 The indicator function 1 E equals 1 if ω ∈ E and 0 otherwise. 18 Absence of arbitrage is generally insufficient to guarantee the existence of a continuous linear pricing rule.
A problem is that the interior of the nonnegative orthant is empty in most interesting infinite-dimensional spaces, thus invalidating most separating hyperplane theorems. See Ross (1978) , Kreps (1981) , and Back and Pliska (1991) for more details. 19 This agent cannot be our agent because adding the topologically small deviation may cause our agent's consumption to lie outside the consumption set.
A be candidate arbitrage payoffs in the traditional setting,
and similarly defineÂ in the no-empty-promises setting to bê
Note that A andÂ are convex cones that exclude the origin. Let X denote closure in the product norm topology for a subset X of C. Here is a version of arbitrage which suits our purpose.
Definition 9.
A free lunch is a candidate arbitrage which is the limit of a sequence of net trades less free disposal taken in states important to the agent; that is, it is an element of A ∩ (M − A). A robust free lunch is a candidate robust arbitrage which is the limit of a similar sequence with free disposal taken additionally in states important to the market; that is, it is an
Note that a robust arbitrage is a robust free lunch. The limit of the sequence of portfolios of butterfly spreads in Example 6 of Section 1 is an example of a robust free lunch. Note, however, that none of the portfolios in the sequence is a robust arbitrage because of the (arbitrarily small but fixed) initial wealth required to purchase the portfolio.
Free disposal in this setting allows us to consider sequences of net trades which might otherwise become "too good" to remain in the commodity space by freely disposing of consumption in states important to either the agent or the market. This is needed for technical reasons: a consumption sequence becoming larger and larger in important states may not converge and would fail to be an arbitrage opportunity. The definition of a free lunch captures our intuition that something dominating an arbitrage payoff in important states also should be an arbitrage opportunity.
We now turn to our definition of optimality. Back and Pliska (1991) suggest that something stronger than optimality is required for the existence of an optimum for some agent to imply either continuous linear pricing or absence of free lunches. Their suggestion applies here. 20 Our final definition provides a notion of optimality sufficient for our purpose.
Definition 10. An optimal consumption demand (c 0 , c 1 ) is called a strong optimum if it is also optimal in the closure of the set that consists of the elements in the budget set plus net trades less free disposal.
The budget set, the set of marketed net trades, and the set of potential arbitrage opportunities depend on whether or not the agent faces the noempty-promises constraint. Let B denote the budget set of consumption satisfying (a) and (b) in the traditional choice problem (Problem 3), and let B denote the analogous budget set for Problem 4. Strong optimality in the no-empty-promises problem, for example, requires the agent to be unable to approximate a consumption plan providing higher expected utility than (c 0 , c 1 ) using a sequence from the setB +M −Â. The need to take closure arises becauseB +M −Â may not be closed, even if the individual setsB, M, andÂ are. 
Results
We now have enough to state a continuous-time version of the traditional fundamental theorem of asset pricing. Theorem 3 can be proven by adapting the proof of our next theorem, so we postpone the proof of Theorem 3. Here is the version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing that has the no-empty-promises constraint. The set of marketed net tradesM and the set of potential robust arbitrage payoffsÂ are nonempty disjoint convex cones, so we can use the separation theorem of Clark (1993, Theorem 5) to obtain a continuous linear functional φ: C → that strictly separateŝ M fromÂ; that is, φ satisfies the condition (∀a ∈Â)(∀m ∈M) φ(m) ≤ 0 < φ(a).
22 Let E be an arbitrary event that occurs with positive P I probability. Notice that the consumption plan (1, 0), which provides one unit of consumption today and none next period, and the consumption plan (0, 1 E ), which provides no consumption today and one unit next period if event E occurs, are potential robust arbitrage opportunities. Because φ separatesÂ andM, the inequalities φ(1, 0) > 0 and φ(0, 1 E ) > 0 must hold.
We will now use φ to construct our continuous superpositive linear pricing rule. Define a new continuous linear functionalφ bŷ
(Recall that c 0 is nonrandom and φ is linear.) It is easy to check thatφ is also a continuous linear functional that separatesM fromÂ, so condition (a) of Definition 8 holds. Condition (b) is true for φ, and it is true forφ for the same reasons. To verify condition (c), note that if c 1 is financed by W 0 , then the consumption plan (−W 0 , c 1 ) is a net trade inM. Thus condition (a) implies that ψ(c 1 ) ≤ W 0 . We now need to show that condition (d) holds. Let E ∈ F be an arbitrary event. For any given whole number n, the consumption plan (0, 1 n 1 + 1 E ) belongs toÂ and must have a positive price; therefore, ψ(1 E ) ≥ 0 by the continuity of φ. Furthermore, note that for any E ∈ F with P I (E) = 0 and P(E ∩ * ) = 0, the consumption plan (0, 1 + λ1 E ) belongs toÂ for all real λ. Strict separation requires the condition
to hold, which would be true only if ψ(1 E ) = 0. Thus ψ defines a continuous superpositive linear pricing rule.
Conversely, suppose that we are given some ψ that defines a superpositive linear pricing rule; we want to show that there are no robust free lunches. Suppose to the contrary that one exists; we will obtain a contradiction. For m = (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ C, define the continuous linear functional φ(m) = c 0 + ψ(c 1 ). Our contrary hypothesis is that there exists a sequence {m n − a n } ⊂M −Â converging to some a ∈Â. This is impossible because φ is continuous and by definition must satisfy the condition (∀n) φ(m n − a n ) < φ(m n ) ≤ 0 < φ(a). Therefore, there cannot be a robust arbitrage.
(ii) We now want to show that there exists an optimum to the consumption choice problem of a hypothetical agent who faces a no-empty-promises constraint, but we must develop some notation first. Let ξ I define the Radon-Nikodym derivative d P I /d P, and let ψ be the linear functional that defines the given superpositive linear pricing rule. The Riesz representation theorem implies that there exists ν ∈ L q ( , F, P), 1/q + 1/ p = 1, such that
Because ψ defines a superpositive linear pricing rule, ν(ω) ≥ 0, P I almost surely and for P almost all ω ∈ * , and ν(ω) > 0 if ξ I (ω) > 0. We now demonstrate that there is a solution to Problem 4 for an agent with initial endowment w = 0 and state-dependent preferences
where
Consider the following new choice problem: choose (c 0 , c 1 ) ∈ C to maximize U (c 0 , c 1 ) subject to the budget constraint c 0 +ψ(c 1 ) = c 0 + E[νc 1 ] ≤ 0 and the nonnegativity condition c 1 ≥ 0, that holds P I almost surely and for P almost all ω ∈ * . A solution to this new problem is optimal for Problem 4 if there is a trading strategy that finances it. First-order sufficient conditions for a solution to the new problem are (iii) The existence of an optimal demand rules out robust arbitrage opportunities, for the net trade could be added to any candidate optimum, increasing expected utility without violating the no-empty-promises constraint. If (c 0 , c 1 ) is a strong optimum, then the intersection of (c 0 , c 1 ) +Â with (B +M −Â) must be empty since preferences are monotonically in-ing in a model with discrete trading or unpredictable jumps in the return distribution.
For simplicity, we assume that the risky assets' instantaneous returns are represented by
where Z is a standard multidimensional Brownian motion. We follow the usual practice of defining the filtration F, which represents information arrival, to be the filtration generated by Z and augmented with P nullsets; this filtration is continuous [Karatzas and Shreve (1988, Section 2.2.7) ].
Trading strategies must satisfy the conditions assumed in Section 4, including those needed to define stochastic integrals. In particular, trading strategies must be predictable. Modifying a strategy to stop investment when wealth first hits zero will not violate any of these conditions, since the time when wealth first hits zero is a stopping time.
For implementation, we want to think of two different types of stopping times. A private version of stopping time available to the agent is the usual definition of stopping time. In this definition it is assumed that the stochastic process is known (in this case from knowledge of the agent's strategy). A public type of stopping time is one that depends on the wealth history and not on knowledge of the agent's particular strategy. An example of a public stopping time is stopping when the agent's wealth hits zero, which is something the market can implement without knowing the agent's strategy. An example of a private stopping time is the last time before wealth first goes negative (which is a stopping time because of the continuous information arrival). A private stopping time is available to the agent (to whom the strategy is known) for construction of an arbitrage, but not to the market's regulatory mechanism. Our proof of enforceability of no-empty-promises uses stopping when wealth hits zero, which is our example of a public stopping time.
We state a new consumption choice problem which includes a constraint that shuts down the agent's investment when wealth first hits zero. Problem 5 differs from Problem 4 only in constraint (c): the no-emptypromises condition in Problem 4 is replaced by the shutdown constraint in Problem 5. In the shutdown constraint, we use the agent's information set since optimization is from the agent's perspective. Nothing essential would be changed if we required this to hold in states important to the market as well.
We now state our main result on enforcement. It says that from the perspective of optimal choice, the no-empty-promises constraint can be replaced by a constraint that shuts down the agent's investment when wealth first hits zero. We now prove Theorem 5.
Proof of Theorem 5. (i) Feasibility requiresθ to be predictable and to satisfy the integrability conditions needed to define stochastic integrals. It will be predictable because it is adapted and because adapted strategies coincide with predictable ones whenever information arrival is continuous. It will be integrable because, by construction, integrals of the modified strategyθ equal integrals of the original strategy θ up to the stopping time τ .
23 Thus the new strategies are integrable if the original strategies are.
The statement that the two strategies are equally desirable follows from a claim thatŴ T = W T , P I almost surely, which we now show. If (θ, W, C) is feasible for Problem 5, the claim is immediate because stopping wealth is redundant on paths of P I -positive probability given the shutdown constraint. To prove the claim when (θ, W, C) is feasible only in Problem 4, we show that if it is false then there is a robust arbitrage available to the agent, which will be a contradiction to the assumption that Problem 4 or Problem 5 has a solution.
Suppose that the claim is false. The P I -nonnegative wealth constraint implies that there is a P I -positive probability set E that contains paths along which wealth hits zero and then eventually becomes positive by time T ; note that 0 =Ŵ T < W T on E. Define a new stopping time τ by inf{t|W t < 0} if such a t exists or T otherwise. The trading strategy θ t 1 {t∈[τ,τ )} , which starts investment at τ and shuts it down when wealth first becomes negative, pays a P I -positive amount on E and ensures that wealth satisfies no-emptypromises (i.e., wealth is pathwise nonnegative P almost surely). Thus we have constructed a robust arbitrage.
The existence of the robust arbitrage immediately rules out an optimum for Problem 4. Adding the arbitrage to an arbitrary feasible strategy in Problem 5 may be infeasible, however, because the shutdown constraint may stop investment before the arbitrage is complete. Thus we will rule out a solution to Problem 5 by showing that the agent can shift a small amount of initial wealth from the strategy to make the arbitrage available, and for a small enough transfer the arbitrage will make it worthwhile at large enough scale. Together these will imply a contradiction to our assumption that Problem 4 or Problem 5 has a solution.
Let B be the payoff of a trading strategy giving a payoff bounded below away from zero and a positive wealth process, scaled to cost w 0 initially. Furthermore, let X > 0, X = 0 be the payoff to the arbitrage strategy as constructed above. Using free disposal if necessary, we may assume without loss of generality that X is a bounded random variable. Monotonicity implies that any terminal consumption plan C in a candidate optimum will be strictly less desirable than C + X ; however, the latter may be infeasible, since if C involves wealth hitting zero, then the agent may be shut down before the arbitrage generating X has been played out. Let ε and n be positive numbers. The consumption plan (1 − ε)C + ε B + n X, formed by shifting some initial wealth from C to B, is feasible because it requires initial investment w 0 and because the investment in B prevents wealth from hitting zero. If utility U is bounded, expected utility is continuous in ε and n by dominated convergence, and for n = 1 and small enough ε, (1 − ε)C + ε B + X is strictly preferred to C. If U is unbounded, then we can choose n to be large and ε (which may depend on n and can be uniformly bounded below by an arbitrary positive number) to obtain unbounded expected utility on the P I -positive probability set of states with X > 0. In either case, Problem 5 cannot have a solution, and our claim is proven.
(ii) By (i), just use τ to construct a new solution to the problem that is given to have a solution.
Conclusion
We have demonstrated a version of the fundamental theorem of asset pricing when agents have dogmatic differences of opinion but are prevented from making empty promises. The primary difference is that linear pricing will be superpositive since a state assigned zero probability by the agent may have a positive price if it is important to the market. Superpositive linear pricing is reconciled with expected utility maximization by ruling out empty promises in important states. The shadow price of the no-empty-promises constraint takes up slack between positive state prices and zero marginal utility. These results are proven for finite-state and continuous-time models.
With continuous information arrival, the no-empty-promises constraint can be enforced by permanently shutting down the agent's investments from the time wealth first hits zero.
